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By Reginald Herbold Green
We must seek our reward in the shining faces of our 
children, the flowers that do not wither.
-  President Samora Moisés Machel
Introduction
Any useful s tra tegic  input into pre-liberation dialogue, decision and planning 
on employment in a liberated (post apartheid) South Africa needs to be more -  
and for that matter less -  than an exercise in numbers crunching and 
technically proficient programme and project formulation and costing. At 
present these would be exceedingly imprecise at best because of gaps in 
available data, the imponderability of the employment/overall economic 
position at liberation and the process and sequence of the post liberation  
transition to empowering black South Africans. Reducing the degree of 
imprecision depends more on overall s trategy, police and sequence decisions, 
analysis of their e ffects  and the run-up to implementation than on econometric 
exercises le t  alone detailed employment need/personnel (manpower) requirement 
calculations of the standard variety . This is  not to denigrate either  
exercise but to suggest that either may well prove to be premature or, at the 
le a s t ,  to be paralleled by a more re f le c tiv e ,  issue posing and broader 
approach.
A series of questions need to be posed - the answers to which are both 
problematic in themselves and important as well as problematic in their  
implications:
1. how is  employment to be defined? i . e . ,  how are part time, small scale 
("informal"), household agricultural producer ("petty commodity" plus 
se lf  provisioning or "peasant") and similar employment/self employment to 
be treated and what importance is  to be given to them?
f *•t
2. what is the operational definition of "workers" and "the working class"?  
I f  "democratic trade unions" is  the answer, th eir  membership to date is  
about 1,000,000 out of a would-be economically active black population of 
about 15,000,000 and is  dominantly located in the top quarter of that 
group in terms of income distribution. How can their breadth as well as 
numbers be expanded? I f  not, then questions as to how to organise and 
support those -  possibly a majority -  of the 10,000,000 who are unlikely 
to be organised by traditional trade union approaches or to benefit from 
traditional labour oriented (so cia lis t  or social democratic) policies  
a r is e .
3. Is unemployment -  however defined -  or poverty seen as central? I f  there 
is  a tradeoff between relatively  high formal sector wages and numbers of 
households remaining in poverty what then? A right to meaningful 
employment or se lf  employment could -  i f  given top p rio rity  -  be made 
operational; one to employment at the present average black industrial  
wage could not.
4. What weight is  to be given to overall expansion of economic resources? 
Expansion in particular sectors -  and i f  so which? The implications on 
the required levels of savings (non-consumption) are substantial.
5. How can the requirements of rapid empowerment of black South Africans 
through building up professional and managerial cadres be melded with 
moving rapidly toward universal access to continuing as well as child 
education? What  ^i f  any  ^are the overall likely cost constraints on 
education and what implications do they have for p r io r i t ie s ,  sequences 
and balances (e .g . against universal academic matric programming?)?
s * y  s l y6. Are universal access to basic services^ feia adequate nutrition ana-'housing 
overriding goals? Is this the case i f  they co n flict  with employment 
expansion or total output growth?
7. Is distributional change to imply major reductions in white wage salary  
and professional earnings? I f  so f what are the training, growth and 
employment implications? I f  not^how is  the remaining level of inequality  
to be made acceptable? As in Zimbabwe by opening "white" scales to 
blacks; raising the bottom a b it ;  le ttin g  inflation erode the top
. - 2 -
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(salaries) more than the bottom (minimum wages and smallholder purchase 
prices)?
8. How are the rural (access to production) and urban (access to housing) 
land questions to be defined and programmed? Is the interim re-creation  
of a black household agricultural producer sub-class desirable and/or 
feasible?
9. Can employment (or other liberation issues) be dealt with adequately in 
the abse^nce of specific  attention to gender divisions of labour, of 
access and of inequality?
10. What is  the policy toward black workers from neighbouring states -  
especially Lesotho and Mozambique -  to be?
Most of these questions will be explored -  d irectly  or im plicitly -  in the 
following sections. They will not be answered because in a very real sense 
the answers are p o l i t ic a l ,  not technical, a lb eit  there are technical
considerations of p o li t ica l  relevance in respect to ranges of practicability  
and of costs .
Any paper on South Africa af ter  Liberation must make e x p lic it  or implicit 
assumptions on when and how. Those of th is  exercise include:
a . liberation in or la te r  than 1990 following a period of intensified  
struggle (but not a war a l 'o u tran ce);
b. a genuine transfer of p o li t ica l  power ( i . e .  a Lancaster House plus type 
'settlem ent') but one involving some compromises and lim itations;
c .  a ruling coalition broadly similar in outlook and goals to the positions
represented by the Freedom Charter and by the ANC, UDF and COSATU among
c j
present organisational foci -  but^including some more conservative and
\  G I C -> r * v >
some more ethnically exclusivistNt»£l-uc«Qes (which may often be the same,
e .g . AZAPO, Inkatha, any p o litica l  group largely grounded on the white 
fraction of the e le c to r a te ) ;
d. an economy debilitated by a conlj.jiuauj.vii vj wjc iyu 1 oxum^  wxth very
substantial (and substantially above 1986 levels) unemployment, poverty 
excess capacity; but
A
e. one in which actual destruction of productive and in frastru ctural assets
during the freedom struggle has been fairly  (or even veryJlim itedf; and
f .  with a majority of the white community remaining -  a t least in i t ia l ly  -
but with both a substantial in it ia l  white departure level and a 
continuing outflow (e .g .  a Zimbabwean but not a Mozambican or Algerian 
p attern ).
In i t ia l  basic economic structure -  of ownership and control -  strategy and 
practice is  discussed e x p lic it ly .  No single clearly  plausible assumption can 
be made, but what is  done in this field will have major implications in 
respect to employment, poverty, distribution, growth and power. That 
statement should not be read as advising marginal or minimal changes -  the 
issues are more complex and problematic than that and a decision for minimal 
change is hardly likely to be feasible either technically or p o li t ic a l ly .
Population, Employment, Categorisation and Poverty
South A frica’ s population (evidently including that in purportedly 
’ independent homelands’ ) in 1980 was 28.7 million growing somewhat under 3 $ a 
year. I ts  1937 level is of the order of 35 million of whom about 5 million 
are white, and 30 million black (African 26, Coloured 3j Indian 1).
The o ff ic ia l  economically active population estimates for 1980 -  including 4$ 
unemployment -  totalled 9,635,000 or 34$ of the population. Applied to 1987 
this would give about 12,000,000. That is  an incredibly low rate  especially  
for a country 80$ of whose population has a ga&gfil'ff!*"!» lower middle income 
country income pattern. The 43$ economically active ra tio  for whites is  
plausible, the 32$ overall for blacks is  not. Unemployment, part time 
employment and "informal" sector employment are clearly  seriously  
underestimated. A more plausible economically active population (including 
unemployed) estimate would be of the order of 14,000,000 to 15,750,000 (40 to 
45$). The additional 2,000,000 to 3,750,000 are almost a l l  either unemployed 
or -  more typically -  receiving very low incomes from casual, "informal" and
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other part time employment.
Unemployment estimates have limited meaning -  except for the white community.
The o ff ic ia l  one of about 500,000 (5$ of re-estimated and 8$ of o ff icia lly
estimated economically active population) for black South Africans is too low
unless any person .with any employment or s e lf  employment income at a ll  is
excluded -  which is  not what the o f f ic ia l  data purport to do. On the other
hand estimates such as Professor Keenan's of 6 ,000,000 black unemployed are
palpably too high unless they are read as lack of employment or self
employment yielding an income at or above the poverty lin e . 40 to 50$ of
South A frica 's  black*economically active population cannot possibly be totally
unemployed -  they cannot afford that^luxuryf A better estimate might be of
the order of 1,500,000 to 2 ,000,000 (10$ to 15$) excluding those with
significant incomes from employment or se lf  employment of any kind but
including those who^while p artia lly  employed or se lf  employed^have negligible
earnings. A significant proportion of this  to ta l  consists of black urban
youth -  for whom 25 to 40$ unemployment estimates are plausible. The estimate
of perhaps 2,000,000 destitute  (1 ,500,000 in 're se rv e s ')  is  not quite the same
thing as i t  includes dependent household members and "unemployable" (age,
illness) persons as well as unemployed. I ^ ^  00  0 ,0 0 0  &r 1 u n t*vvvp 
-iKUv OuS'K, 'f» Uc. Of fio OrjtLO
$ , 0 0 0  0 0 0  to 0 , o o O j O a o t
The pattern of employment has steadily shifted from rural to urban. The 
African population distribution trend since 1960 masks th is  /^African urban *  
population stayed in the low 30$ range while the 'reserve ' population snare 
rose from 37$ to 53^ * However, th is  is  the result of forced removals not of *  
employment sh ifts  -  indeed almost a l l  near poverty line or higher level income 
for 'reserve' residents is  earned in urban or quasi urban areas. While 
variations among 'reserves' are substantial, rarely is  over 20$ of household 
income earned in them and in some cases 10$ or le s s .  A clearer picture is  
given by the decline of the proportion of Africans in 'white' rural areas from 
37$ in 1946 to 13$ in 1980.
Occupational distribution has also changed s ig n ifican tly . Agriculture's share 
f e l l  from 30$ in i 960 to 21$ in 1980. Non-agricultural employment on average 
appears to have become more skilled (higher proportions in professional, 
managerial and c le r ic a l  and a higher skilled proportion within production) and 
more c le r ic a l /s a le s  oriented. The black share of jobs in the higher -  and 
especially middle -  sk il l  and training level categories rose from 1960 to 198O
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but quite slowly and to levels rarely above half the black population 
proportion, e .g .  40Í in professional and technical (dominated by black health 
and education) versus 85Í of population. This g lacia l  movement is  the result  
of legislation andYwhite labour resistance not of demand -  South A frica 's  
economy has been -^ágreedXfai r  1 y generally^ to be contrained by shortages of 
skilled, professional and managerial pesonnel except in prolonged slump 
periods (as at present).
Heal wage movements in recorded employment over the past 70 yea r^s have very --------2  \ U -h-c r\ W, *<>-/
slightly narrowed white/black d ifferen tia ls ‘^ ' ‘~'entri'rely since 1970. Over 
1915-1970 the trend was in the other direction especially in mining (the 
classic  external labour reserve s e c t o r ) . Mining and
manufacturing/construction wages have now come to be roughly comparable for 
each ethnic group (adjusting for the higher "fringe benefit" and "income in 
kind" component of black mining incomes)# This represents a sharp sh if t  from 
the past. White mining incomes were over double those in manufacturing in 
1916, a differen tial that has been fa irly  steadily eroded since. Black were 
comparable in 1915 but declined in real terms to 1970 when they were only one 
third of those in manufacturing with a very rapid subsequent convergence led 
by higher increases in mining (virtual quadrupling in real terms over 
1970-82).
These movements of wages in the secondary production sector are by no means 
necessarily representative of the incomes of economically active black persons 
or of black households. Unemployment has risen and real incomes from 
non-recorded employment/self employment have probably declined sign ifican tly  
in real terms in rural areas and perhaps in urban.
As already noted^the 6,000,000 black "unemployment" estimate really  appears to 
be an estimate of distinctly  sub-poverty line incomes. Extrapolating to 
household level i t  implies that 15 million black South Africans -  50% -  are at  
or below the absolute poverty l in e «-Wi"'fly c<-"t ¿< 7 c r* ■ ‘y ■
P a r a a  1 l-yj
Therevhas been a growth in black share of personal incomes from 25% in 1924 to 
HOJt in 1980 but this needs to be qualified. The black proportion of to ta l  
population has also risen and 40Í of personal income for 85Í of population 
divided on ethnic lines shows very marked in stitu tio n al (s ta te  and other) 
inequality and inequity in distribution of income. Most of the r ise  came
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after 1970 and appears to be related to very substantial real income increases 
for black formal (including public as well as private) sector employees 
(partly but not fully) relating to skilling to accomodate changing production 
structures and employment requirements.
Therefore, the overall improvement has been accompanied by sharply increased
intra-black income differen tials  and quite probably /judging by the Namibian
C ri jrn»V ir v  1 1
parallel) by rising >evolo- » f and proportions a n  'absolute poverty. This is
borne out by the o f f ic ia l  blackjeolk^nically active population estimates which 
show a decline from 36% in 1951 to 32% in 1 9 8 O. Given the unlikelihood that 
true economically active proportions f e l l  (they rose for whites and Indians 
and were basically constant forXN coloureds^ , th is  strongly implies a greater 
proportion in dominantly low income "casual” , "informal" and/or part time 
occupations -  particularly among 're se rv e 1 residents.
Output, Growth, Investment and Consumption
South Africa has had a very uneven growth record. Over 1911-1985 i t  averaged 
3.8$, but that growth ccme largely in spurts. In the 1960s and early
1970s a rate of about 6% was achieved, fallin g to under 356 over 1974-1980 and 
under *\% since 1 9 8 0 . Indeed the 2 .9Í  1970-85 growth record (like the
negligible 1 9 8 1—85 one) is  d istin ctly  Sub-Saharan African and not at a l l  
typical of the upper middle income group of countries to which South Africa 
(with a 1982 GDP per capita of $2,670) formally belongs. This relates in part 
to the fact that South Africa has remained a primary exporter while the more 
^ ■ successful members of this s t a t i s t i c a l  category have moved to dominantly
' - - h i
{
t i ls. K ~
■h
manufactured exports (e .g .  South Korea, B raz il) .
Growth of employment has averaged about one half that of GDP with a gross 
capital output ra tio  -  except during slumps -  of 3*0 or le s s .  The la t te r  does 
not suggest that the economy in general (contrary to popular impression) is  
radically over capital intensive. The black labour force (would be
(/_/ economically active population) is  likely to grow 3% a year in the medium
ti> ^ term. / Therefore to prevent a worsening of the present unemployment and
o  ~h ^  jj,
/? i absolute poverty rates  would require growth of 6% a year (0n more
optimistic assumptions of the underlying Employment/GDP ratio  and of future\ «— ; k t £>, Cl Mi vtiJ1 J Lj J
infrastructural investment needs¿ %%T I f  in addition i t  is  proposed to end
| X f  a« * {V A .i lc  +W4 ckj 3»-) '"Kl , 0
cF £> f- CF +o clJLX i X5 o***( j j , i '* '-
h  - K > o  U ^ U .  7 ^  A  + r ' « '  f e r  ^
P & w >  7  t * r  s w k i  l c  ' Cfc->-$ C v fV 'L i
\ ¿ r  í y b f  t 4  "fo %f-Mort*:' f * *  -
dr¿v )l 2- '[ c\ f  ^ / w - ^ - w  f r i i  i J ^'v i Ft
c o « V t% v -V > 'f lA j - t w V  H ? 0 j  ¿‘P C ' / a A V I  
o  r - ^ - h ' ^ s  i"m  A A ' A o /  u / i r c
n  e>* ¿  ly  UT^tv for 1UM *. f  .’ «  j  ■;
a .  t «  s e . s b * ¿ ~ . t  - * « 7  í - V a . ^ o
R i J i r  W ^ i w  —  ) ^ ^ ^ C o » i j ( W i f r  '/
0 ^ 4 ]  -  G*y S ^ o  [s^ f\f CO f  — WA.S 
< t  « l O . - ,  0  * w f  C  t > ^  1 7  f r w  6 ^  ^  ^  ¿ v  *  1
o f ' C\ P o V t ^ K *• I $ r  &'  ^C & £<*> rx ¿  * v ^
! • ? } t f
y*w*\ W * > A  '*'* <__■' ^  L'. \  ^iv  ¿V- ¡-- v j a. • j  U ' - * '"
r«Ar<i>s *
C. ó 1 "
W^A r  ^
p £ r d  JL w  ; \ u  cA \ ^  £. tf  A. j  ! t r 1 d
0  0 \ ( > o t  J * r f & l y  í r - ^ f t ü K .  f
J> 0/“ r /A > *H
fi [\ * vvn. 0^  ^  ^ v 1 ^  ü V' v C-1 t y ^ { *r » v
v   d rv\-{jt \ -y 1 v.?rv a f * 1^ UV<  ^
\
¿  A ‘V i w  ! w d  o P  T W u c
Xt^'|\ ¿ v ^  y *  P  d  W  P t i u < /  <f t i
vSa, ^  C*t \sJjL <^>
J . r  l y  £«/-*> \
0  » 11 L* o  <x {i a  i**\ ► * l o  I s
ójV I e* ¿ V* p  ^U ^ k H  6;
$* ( A l / t i i  “P  >N r c Ia  *V>\ *•
K' V» J) <•%# ¿tv »n <>\ p<“¿> i ^  ^  > <**
$P K a r o o )  w cl\ *»+■ I c
e. c- cf ^  O r f V W  #\ )
1 U  o #- ir r j M  t  j
r~ r ^ \ t e \ c i j  . t j “h  l U  fx* f > n  d r *
frOr- CS t-) p )  w^~f> I Jy n^^\“b ^^4
r^ CO ( 0 j C c\ | r  d.AL.J J
t> W c o f e r  c &  Ü 6 e / K  O  A  . p o r t *
>W\+
Üaj dg v^ CV^  i /^*2 -0 3 C/-^ l C*
IS VV'x i( CO*“x V c ^ C '  *1^ ^ O
C ^ U C_\ fv | t-Vv^ -íX bpA/J I^C) U ?rt i 't i  i  Vy
k i  ^ V># /  o ^ i [ V  f  r <v'Ko¿
*^JL Ioa.j o f> *ri*JL  ;
» *f& C./ c*vMi ^  C^ Av. \ *S £ t 5^-] ♦X*>C£wS i
4o I©**- 4 T C S-C^riVc \ ( I *^ tA v£ t  + %
H r  >poa”1" cceg  4 a  ^ clf
&0 bx#v I t^ v ^  Qj A*\j c.*-*s-- O a^>- ^  AOy-Cf 0 ^*"
V i
p « v p  tr ¿ w J .  *b U  i> v M  i ^ ^ w  * II
t  ^  {\  'Vo r *  í} ^  f *\cy ^  * w  W v T * k |
/ v h \ V )  ¿ x ^ i j  o r  
*p> \ L x ^ y  \  t v W v  j t  ^  'b-t i P t? r  »V o  ^  ^ '
absolute poverty within two decades an 8%i a year GDP growth rate is  needed
even i f  a substantial reduction in absolute poverty can be achieved during
transition (recreating an economically viable black household farming
sub-class, substituting small black c a p ita l is ts  -  or cooperatives -  for
departing white ones, providing removal of discrimination against and
provision of extension services to the ’'informal" sector, especially in urban
r * v A l > y
services and housing construction). I f  not, 10Í would/'be'required.
\ P ' V » V  vfcF-hr
Assuming a 3*5 capital/output ra tio  a-££e£ the half decade' -  when a
lower ratio  may be attainable from u tilisa tio n  of excess *and rehabilitation of 
semi deteriorated^capacity built up since 1981»-,an 8/b growth rate would require 
fixed investment of 28% of GDP and a 10% one of 35*. As South African 
domestic savings have rarely exceeded 18% for any sustained period and 
prospects for massive net resource inflows in excess of interest and 
repayments are poor (except perhaps for o f f ic ia l  flows immediately after the 
liberation transition) even a 28% rate would imply a major boost in savings 
primarily from higher enterprise (especially public enterprise) retained
'fron^and/enhanced government revenue in excess of recurrent spending 
growth ( i . e .  increased state  saving).
earnings.
¡ t j s b k t
—- ,i . , ■
Universal access to basic services plus some transfer payment increases to 
households otherwise in absolute poverty will require substantial increases in 
public consumption (and to a lesser  extent capital) expenditure. However, the 
’ secu rity ’ , administrative, subsidy and amenity white service costs of the 
apartheid regime may allow savings on recurrent expenditure of up to 5% of 
GDP. In that case public consumption might account for 15% of GDP (which 
implies a recurrent budget of the order of 25% to 30Í of GDP). Taken together 
with investment that leaves 51% for private consumption expenditure.
51% is below the h is to ric  South African -  or indeedY upper middle income 
country -  private consumption share. For i t  to be consistent with a 20 year 
target date for absolute poverty eradication will require very careful 
attention to avoiding substantial real increases not only to upper income 
group members but also to those with 1.5 to 2 .0  times the poverty datum line 
(household) income. As will be sketched l a t e r ,  th is  will/^ result in 
substantial tensions,'at bestTand may be unattainable.
The balance of payments constraint -  which has c learly  held back South African
- 9 -
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growth in most years since 1973 ~ will not _ be examined in any detail here.
\po o
However, givenvnon-precious metal and coalYprospects and the uncertainty of 
the gold price, restoration of a 6% to 8$ export growth rate  (to balance an Q% 
GDP growth rate) would appear to require a breakthrough into manufactured 
exports on a broad front probably in itia l ly  targetted primarily on SSA and 
Indian Ocean markets.
k
There are good reasons to assume that such a breakthrough may be possible. 
F irs t ,  South Africa -  like South Korea at the beginning and Brazil by the 
middle of the 1960s -  has built up a broadly based manufacturing sector behind
~ L T S v C .vvy'C* rtf.j'-v  a ] J  ;
protective barriers, incremental,^ cost's'''are not se lf  evidently vastly
above globally competitive levels. At -  and after  -  the in i t i a l  manufactured 
export breakthroughs, analyst's* of South Korea and Brazil for several years 
concentrated on proving why such a breakthrough could not take place. Second,
apartheid raises unit labour costs in manufact uring desp ite,—holding black;
wages down -  i . e .  i t  is economically in efficient especially in respect to 
exports of manufactures. Third, liberation should s ign ifican tly  improve South 
African access to African and Asian markets.
These reasons do not guarantee a breakthrough. They do indicate why a 
selective state  export strategy combining domestic market broadening and 
protection (to lower unit costs and to provide a strongvsurplus base 
respectively) with export promotion and support would have a substantial 
chance of success.
Taking a ll  these factors into account, i t  is  therefore unlikely that universal 
access to employment/self employment generating incomes equal to or above the 
poverty line at household level can be achieved in under two decades/although 
substantial progress can and should be made much sooner. Th^t^goal may well 
require a longer period^/. The children of the adults who make the liberation  
are likely to be the f i r s t  generation to be able to enjoy the fu ll  f ru its  of 
even efficient implementation of well selected programmes for meeting this  
goal. This reality  has several implications:
a. unfulfillable expectations of immediate, universal escape from poverty 
(or white wage and salary scales for black workers) should not be built  
up and, indeed, should be demobilised to the greatest extent possible.
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b. the transition period -  including the probable departure of many white
workers and petty cap ita lis ts  and the p ossib ility  of land reforms - 
should be utilised to achieve a substantial i n i t i a l  reduction in poverty;
c . building up higher and less unequally distributed present and future
productivity through universal access__to--ba-sáo— —watj&r 
and extension ..services should have top p r io r i ty ;
d. progress toward raising employment levels (and at least for black workers 
average incomes) and reducing numbers in absolute poverty should be 
sustained -  not highly cy c lica l  -  and therefore should be targetted at 
attainable r a te s . This point of targettin g  for sustainable levels and 
growth rates applies to public se€or employment in support of providing 
universal access to education, health, water, extension services and (in 
this case complementary to other sectors, e .g .  small scale private or
co-op builders)' housing. Both in respect to operating personnel and to5 Zf'✓ t O tS a_r-^ v __K,;J.^
construction (public works) employees~^je*r"'can "and should be employment
growth poles^&ub cannot and should not seel-q to be "employers of last
Vn©r wi t J r  ~V*j
resort" to reduce open unemployment wfogt-gvW tne' cost in terms"* of 
directly productive investment foregone or in fla tion ;
e. while certain policies and investments whose d irect effect is inequality
sustaining may be necessary (e .g .  limiting f a l ls  in real incomes of some
categories of white personnel), the burden of proof that they really do
enhance employment growth and absolute poverty reduction indirectly more
than they limit them directly  should rest on th eir  proponents and should
require concrete evidence (not generalised claims) to discharge 
0. J l  "tWvT or | rv/t
Distribution and Redistribution
Redistribution can be divided into primary (redistribution of assets and other 
means of access to income generation -  notably employment); secondary (human 
investment particularly  via education, health and extension services) and 
te r tia ry  (consumption transfer payments). From the perspective of employment 
growth and sustainable absolute poverty reduction^ the second is probably the 
most important and eff ic ie n t  in the long term with the f i r s t  ranking next (and 
central in certain contexts)v The third is  necessary for meeting the
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needs of those who cannot for individual or macro economic reasons be provided 
with access to adequate income earning opportunities t but is  usually 
technically inferior generating present or future production and
employment «¡%s wtl| I *-v up f>^ r  T v C*\ \ \ v?*v ^
W  o* c U * ^ o c / w h ' c  p o u u d ^
&¿»iieí*£yj Redistribution can be out of flows -  i . e .  growth -  or existing  
stocks -  i . e .  assets . The second is  clearly crucial to transition periods, Hritf
y|istorically attaining greater income equality based on land reform appears to 
have been a sound basis for subsequent rapid growth without high levels of 
absolute poverty in several Asian countries es-pee^ai-by when universal access 
to training and education wasYgiven priority . Asset redistribution can also
central to providing an economic substructure for an e a r lie r
infrastructural^transfer of p o litica l power,
Redistribution primarily out of growth has the advantage of limiting the 
number of absolute (as opposed to relative) losers and the extent of th eir  
lo ss . - I t  therefore tends to reduce overt opposition, passive obstruction and 
departure.
However, in the South African context there is  a severe lim it on . i t s  
ap p licab ility . Relatively rapid progress toward equal pay for equal work is  
needed  ^ Elimination in a finite  time period of purely ra c ia l  inequalities
in income^ ¥ I f  this is  achieved, at present real white wage and salary r a te s ,  
two major problems will arise>v.-'|he degree of inequality between presently
"white" and presently "black" jobs will be very high and in tra  black income 
inequality raised to normatively unacceptable levels . Further, the cost of
high level personnel will slow expansion of their employment -  and in d irectly  r - - '-1-’'-'
v employment more generally. Unfortunately rapid erosion of real white
incomes by reducing inequality by levelling upper wages and salaries  down and
-^1 rv C J S J
lower up (or by reducing upperyt(5 increase investidle surplus) will lead to
premature departure of a large proportion of present white high and middle
level personpower» whose- objection is  not to altered p o li t ica l  power or 
relative income equalisation per se but to sharp losses in their present (and 
by projection their children's future) real incomes. I f  too rapid^ such an 
exodus can have damaging resu lts  on growth of production and employment and on 
reduction of absolute poverty.
The—point—made~~above~---t>heHfej jL/i more technologically advanced sectors and
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enterprises apartheid raises unit labour cost despite lowering black wages
yv-'k* \ v p  K I’sy  ^ v v /b ecau se  i t  reduces average labour productivity more than average payáis
1 '  * "  *<— M IH i'W  n  ~ '»M a a a ^ ! y
relevant,,^ On the one hand i t  suggests that reorganisation after  aparthied can
rAO
\ t * ' ' Ygenerate substantial additional labour productivity to validate -  or at least
\  \  Vlake viable -  higher wages. However, i t  may also mean that for some years the
ratio  of output ^growth to that , of employment is  above i t s  long term trend 
V" -i»vh W v r v U /
level of about 2“"tó raisit£g the rate  of GDP growth needed to make
I
significant inroads into either open unemployment or sub-poverty line ** 
very low productivity)^, inaemployment/self employment.
Redistribution of employment is  relevant largely at middle and higher levels  
lower and lower middleware already predominantly black. Except in the 
in i t ia l  phases of transition i t  will be largely out of flows -  i . e .  increases
in employment. As the white population of a liberated South Africa is likely
to decline gradually for at least two decades following a
sharp transitional f a l l ,  th is  redistribution is  inevitable.
Income redistribution will arise  largely from redistribution of access to 
employment and se lf  employment. However, in i t ia l ly  a significant proportion 
may arise from reduction of inequality in present wage and salary scales and 
moving to a non-ethnic "equal pay for equal work" position.
Redistribution of access to s k il ls  and to health (human capital) basically  
turns on achieving universal access and integrating the present ethnic systems 
of education/training, health and extension. The l a t t e r  will pose problems as 
the white system has unit cost levels which cannot be generalised to the
entire population so that a lower cost approach must be formulated, adopted
and implemented.
Housing redistribution is  of necessity primarily an issue of constructing 
(including occupier constructing) more^and more adequate^ black housing EotVt in 
urban and in rural areas. The chief problem is  that low income housing in
South Africa (as in most other countries) is  almost impossible to make 
econoraicaly a t t ra c t iv e ,  within the paying power of the occupiers and meeting
minimum human standards of l iv a b ility  at th$ same time. Because of the
u t  Vi? 0*1foreseeable tight limits on the public pursev government construction and/or
rent subsidies for alf'^ appear ’ impracticable except at a high cost to
employment growth outside construction and building m aterials. Site and
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needs of those who cannot for individual or macro economic reasons be provided
with access to adequate income earning opportunities f but is  usually
technically inferior gener'ating present or future production and
employment I *v T * o» ^  <*■.*(,
Wr a o-  ^ v*n *y ( j t^ P c / 'A - ir i c  p 0 uv* Í ^  S C»,
Redistribution can be out of flows -  i . e .  growth -  or existing  
stocks -  i . e .  assets . The second is  clearly crucial to transition periods,
h is to rica lly  attaining greater income equality based on land reform appears to 
have been a sound basis for subsequent rapid growth without high levels of
absolute poverty in several Asian countries when universal access
to training and education wasYgiven priority . Asset redistribution can also
be central to providing an economic substructure for an e a r lie r
infrastructural^transfer of p o litical power,
Redistribution primarily out of growth has the advantage of limiting the 
number of absolute (as opposed to relative) losers and the extent of th eir  
lo ss . - I t  therefore tends to reduce overt opposition, passive obstruction and 
departure.
However, in the South African context there is  a severe limit on i t s
ap p licab ility . Relatively rapid progress toward equal pay for equal work is  
neededf ^.imination in a fin ite  time period of purely ra cia l  inequalities
in income!^ If  this is achieved, at present real white wage and salary r a te s ,
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two major problems will arise>v¿ pie degree of inequality between presently
"white” and presently "black” jobs will be very high and intra black income 
inequality raised to normatively unacceptable lev els . Further, the cost of
1 Ihigh level personnel will slow expansion of their employment -  and in d irectly
v- —---^employment more generally. Unfortunately. 1^3 rapid erosion of real white
incomes by reducing inequality by levelling upper wages and salaries  down and
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lower up (or by reducing upper , tó'~increase investible surplus) will lead to
premature departure of a large proportion of present white high and middle
level personpower, whose* objection is  not to altered p o li t ica l  power or 
relative income equalisation per se but to sharp losses in their present (and 
by projection their children’ s future) real incomes. I f  too rapid^ such an 
exodus can have damaging resu lts  on growth of production and employment and on 
reduction of absolute poverty.
‘Phe—^ jGi.-nt—made~~above~-“bhe<fcj Jji more technologically advanced sectors and
enterprises apartheid raises unit labour cost despite lowering black wages
\T h i‘
because i t  reduces average labour productivity more than average pay,vis
re le v a n t^  On the one hand i t  suggests that reorganisation after  aparthied can
^generate substantial additional labour productivity to validate -  or at least
ake viable -  higher wages. However, i t  may also mean that for some years the
ratio  of output erowth to that , of employment is  above i t s  long term trend 
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level of about 2-”tó raisirfgi the rate  of GDP growth needed to make
I
significant inroads into either open unemployment or sub-poverty line ■»»(* 
very low productivity;,,^employment/self employment.
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Redistribution of employment is  relevant largely at middle and higher levels \
83» lower and lower middleware already predominantly black. Except in the 
in i t ia l  phases of transition i t  will be largely out of flows -  i . e .  increases 
in employment. As the white population of a liberated South Africa is likely  
to decline gradually for at least two decades following a
sharp transitional f a l l ,  th is  redistribution is  inevitable.
Income redistribution will arise  largely from redistribution of access to 
employment and se lf  employment. However, in i t ia l ly  a significant proportion 
may arise from reduction of inequality in present wage and salary scales and 
moving to a non-ethnic "equal pay for equal work" position.
Redistribution of access to s k il ls  and to health (human capital) basically  
turns on achieving universal access and integrating the present ethnic systems 
of education/training, health and extension. The l a t t e r  will pose problems as 
the white system has unit cost levels which cannot be generalised to the 
entire population so that a lower cost approach must be formulated, adopted 
and implemented.
Housing redistribution is  of necessity primarily an issue of constructing 
(including occupier constructing) more^and more adequate^black housing Eottl in 
urban and in rural areas. The chief problem is  that low income housing in
South Africa (as in most other countries) is  almost impossible to make 
econoraicaly a t t ra c t iv e ,  within the paying power of the occupiers and meeting 
minimum human standards of liv ab ility  at thf same time. Because of the
foreseeable tight limits on the public purse, government construction and/or
, , . j  . „ \  VvC* O -51. O I • J  ,rent subsidies for a l l A appear - impracticable except at a high cost to
employment growth outside construction and building m aterials. Site and
✓
- 1 3 -
service schemes combined with occupier hiring of "informal" sector building
W
teams and. credit (financed perhaps by a payroll tax) scheme for urban and 
rural workers might be more practicable/bfali Betailed analysis and, preferably, 
some experiments are needed , W . ^ ^  *■*-' • A **
Ci.rV* c v U t  i s U *
Redistribution of other assets  -  excluding state  acquisition -  re la te s
primarily to small black c a p ita l is ts ,  cooperatives and autogestion groups.
The assets (businesses) they acquire are likely to have been rundown or 
abandoned, which will increase their need for improved access to (not 
necessarily lower in terest on) credit and for extension and training service  
support.
Land redistribution may be crucial if  i t  can be used to recreate  a viable 
black household farming sector (small and middle peasantry in • Chinese and 
small individual farmer in Yugoslav s o c ia lis t  terminology in which these 
sub-classes are viewed positively for the foreseeable future). This would be 
a relativ ely  labour intensive approach to generating up to 2,000,000 household 
incomes at or above the poverty lines by take-over and reallocation of the » 
white kulak or large peasant/petty ca p ita l is t  farms andV'^aevelopm^nF'^oT 
’ reserve’ land to increase productivity (preferably with some consolidation i f  
th is  can be achieved without radically increasing 'reserve ' income
inequality). The peripheral white farmers -  probably two thirds -  are heavily 
in debt and clearing l i t t l e  net income on their operations. If  experience
elsewhere in SSA is any guide.small or medium scale black household producers 
could achievé'-living i^ncomes from these lands i f  they were taken over and 
parcelled out in 5 to 10 ha holdings (larger for extensive herding land). I f  
1,500,000 households could be relocated (at their own request) -  basically  
from the ’ reserves’ -  and 500,000 ’ reserve’ households assisted in achieving 
viable incomes then the to ta l  of 6 ,000,000 black households in absolute
poverty could be reduced by a third during the tran sition al period. Zimbabwe
experience suggests that this is  not a pipe-dream. However, beyond
a few localised pockets Vi South Africa has not had an economically viable 
black household agricultural sub-class (peasantry) for at least three decades.) Í' 
the problem of retraining farmers as well as extension workers and of 
designing appropriate supporting services may be harder and require a longer 
time period to achieve major resu lts  than was the case in Zimbabwe.
•1 m * *
I t  would be quite unsafe to speculate on how many African farming households
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would wish to stay (and increase output) in present 're se rv e s ',  how many would 
wish to move to former 'white' farms and how many would seek to combine an 
urban wage job with a rural production (at least for household self  
provisioning) and retirement base. The la s t  pattern has been unexpectedly 
common in Zimbabwe (and is common in Yugoslavia where small family farm 
household incomes are often substantially from non agricultural wage 
employment of one or more household members) . This may prove to be the case 
in a liberated South Africa as well. What is  now known is  that:
a . many black South Africans have clearly  stated a desire to secure land to 
farm;
b. there is  ample evidence that -  especially with government extension, 
input and infrastru ctural support -  African family farmers (middle and 
small peasants) can both generate household incomes near to or above the 
poverty line and produce e ff ic ie n tly  in terms of costs and use of scarce 
resources;
c .  the majority of 'white' farms are marginally viable ( i f  that) now and 
would be to ta lly  unviable i f  they paid black employees wages at or above 
the poverty line;
d. abandonment of these farms (which is  already taking place in some
d is tr ic ts )  will s ign ifican tly  reduce agricu ltu ral output and
employment;
e. therefore, a research and policy priority  is  seeing how the expressed 
black South African land hunger and potential ab ility  to generate 
acceptable incomes from farming can be supported by allocation of the 
much of the presented 'white' farmland backed by state  services to 
contribute both to agricultural output and -  even more crucial - to 
reducing rapidly the number of black households below the poverty line.
Economic Organisation
The basic goals of structural reorganisation of economic organisation
(including mode of production and production relatio n s) in a liberated South
- 1 5 -
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Africa will presumably be to achieve people’ s control (in many but not a l l  
respects via the state’ as their representative) over production, distribution  
and accumulation. Even putting to one side what constraints will be imposed 
by the in i t ia l  liberation coalition -  which may well include some fractions of
white and of black capital -  that goal does not answer „ questions as to
\ l  c aoi- ef-.-ii'! .iS *
instruments, p rio rities  and sequences " say much about the appropriate 
in i t ia l  degree of s tate  (and/or decentralised public sector) ownership.
Certain implications of the strategy presented in this paper are fa ir ly  
straightf orward:
a. government recurrent expenditure is likely to be of the order of 25 to 
30? of GDP;
b. because private investment is hardly likely to exceed 10? of GDP 
(whatever may or may not be desired), government and public enterprise
investment will need to be of the order of 15 to 20? of GDP;
existing parastatal enterprises plus major finance external trade, units,  
agricultural marketing (currently quasi s ta ta l)  and ’ abandoned’ large or 
medium enterprises would be lively to be of the order of 40? of
O'*,} Jh Unon-government: output jtrr,'d^£cf give very substantial leverage (and via the 
l i fe  assurance,/ sector^ in some cases> eTfective ownership control) over 
another 20 to 30?;L&> HVx * I^ c i ' l   ^ 'h-'C
d. ^  universal access to basic services, employment expansion, income
\a-S/management, personpower_planning and export promotion strategies^ketched  
(as—well as'Ni-fa©' land reform) ¡jail requireA substantial s ta te  control and 
action at micro as well as macro level and through s ta te  in stitu tion s and 
direct (e .g . through the 50? of GDP accounted for by "a" and ”b” above) 
resource allocation as well as through regulation and market management.
(C ™
Therefore, the implicit post apartheid liberation period p o li t ica l  economic
strategy can be described as one managing a mixed economy but a mixed economy
r with a dominant public sector u tiliz in g  state  ownership, expenditure policy,i 5 I ____  ^ _____V -— '  regulatióñ_“ánd~key^(e.g. finance, external trade) dominance to determine the
course and organisation of economic a c t iv i ty .  If  combined with a democratic 
government dominated by the ANC plus C0SATU and UDF and''''¿"substantial degree
\ J w l  o p P W i \ C- O W f J r A 'O  
of worker co-determination at enterprise ’ . . ¿i thi^\/wouTd* appear both to be 
consistent with implementing the Freedom Charter and with the
beginning of a transition to socialism. X V  \aSQJI '{ n &T 
ttH U t/1 Cw^l ' Ci ^ p  C \ \ \ \ n  o x  *t^C i ^  ; ' - (\ ,
r
The issues or questions which are much more problematic do~not relate"to  broad 
directions but to timing, sequences, re la tiv e  worker and state  roles in 
production relations/workplace co-determination. One evident case is the pace
I and means of exerting effective control (beyond that given by financial and 
external trade sector dominance and the weight of the budgetary and public 
.enterprise sectors) over the major mining and other conglomerate capital 1 
groupsZ« This is  not at a ll  se lf  evidently an area in which immediate broad 
front State acquisition of ownership would maximise effective state  control, 
levels of output and employment or effective  worker co-determination. To 
review that and other issues requires a more disaggregated approach.
"Monopoly ca p ita l" -  both domestic and external TNC - poses special problems 
and potential s  ^ In general i t  is  capable of substantial production... and 
.accumulation ¿^ re la tiv e ly  e f f ic ie n t ,  with access to knowledge to carry out —
economic structure .transformations anav'the best potential for achieving a 
\  »r\YO y
breakthrough non-primary product exports. In addition i t
and i t s  senior employees are often re la tiv e ly  flexib le_and prepared to live  
with higher wages and taxes (especially i f  they lead to rapid growth in demand 
and in worker productivity) , as well as with greater^ -  or ^different .-.^ecoiiQmj^ c 
intervention Jpy. the.JSt a t e , so long as they see the gains from accommodatipn^as
greater,^than those^jf r om  ^n on -  coo p g r a t i  on or withdrawal. Their centralised,
hierarchical structures and information systems make them relatively easy to 
control (at least in principle) and also cause them to respond in predictable 
ways to macro economic instruments.
However, these corporations (especially the domestic ones) do represent the
apex of capitalism and of inequality in South Africa  and have been the largest.  — ■ .. -•    -
and most visible ( i f  in many cases far from the most vicious) exploiters r- iff
the technical or the colloquial sense. Further th eir  size, structure and 
levels of sk ills  make control easier on paper than in practice and the danger.
of being used by (rather than using) them substantial. Further acquisition of
ownership (perhaps especially of majority but not 100Í ownership)'" 'intil 
adequate s tate  monitoring capacity is  built up and substantial libecaLicJO. 
Gommit4>ed-"-~and* technically competent management cadres ) emplaced in the
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enterprises 'may be even less effective than control from outside 
. compulsory board membership augmented by strengthened trade unions. DecisionsV cw^l s fc a \ > <; t n :;6. J
— /T&áy wéTT vary from sector to sector. Finance and external trade are both the 
traditional and the logical sectors for an early dominant s tate  ownership 
presence because of their roles in mobilising and allocating (or dissipating) 
investible surpluses and foreign exchange.
Middle sized capital has both less potential for good and for resistin g
-----------------------  Vri«Kt Jl £ j
change. H istorically  (indeedYto date) i t s  owners and managers have been
significantly more pro apartheid (often for souhdye'dbhbmic reasons) and more
antagonistic to liberation than large (high or monopoly) ca p ita l .  The casex  Ccti t  )
for supportive takeovers of firms being run down or abandoned is  strong!, 
for deliberate nationalisation is weaker than for monopoly capital^ Ut ,at this
level of enterprise even a large number of such takeovers will not a l te r  the
dominant mode of production. W» l-\ p'V f  C*r-'V\0*v\.. {
CXrr^Oüfshi O f C x ^ X  f* O U  T C <?<“F  Í
¿  Cm ’íVC.I'Íw'
The land quedt*ion -  i . e .  large white family (kulak or large peasant) and small 
! white ca p ita lis t  agricultural capital has been discussed above. Small capital
generally poses severe problems. In general i t  is  among the sub-classes most 
opposed to liberation and most tied to apartheid. individually
insignificantj in sum small cap ita lis t  enterprises are of central importance 
to several sectors^"^e.g. re ta i l  trade, local rural transport. Rapid 
disintegration of the sector by a mass exodus of white petty c a p ita l is ts  would 
require rapid replacement or severe direct and indirect damage would resu lt -  
as in Mozambique.
On the other hand neither buying off the small c a p ita lis ts  nor direct s ta te  
ownership is a very a ttractiv e  option. The former would be very expensive -  
economically and politically^  the la t te r  would dissipate s tate  personnel and 
'institutional resources to a degree inconsistent with achieying overall  
economic control and selective large scale takeovers -  on the record
elsewhere would be unlikely to produce very good production, surplus 
generation or employment resu lts .
However, South .Africa is  not Mozambique. Black s k i l ls ,  entrepreneurial 
capacity and business experience are qualitatively greater . Therefore, the 
optimal gap f il l in g  would probably be by black private, co-operative and 
autogestion units with state  technical and financial backup.
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Productlon relations are hard to sh ift  from the top down. They are more
likely to be alterable from the shop floor up, i . e .  by trade unions effective
both at negotiating with owners/managers on behalf of workers and at winning
(and U3ing) worker participation in all basic enterprise practices and
decisions. South African democratic trade unions appear to be committed to
these objectives and should (on liberation) receive state  support (but not
smother love) and be encouraged to a s s is t  the s ta te  in monitoring private
enterprise a c t iv i ty .  Arguably achieving both decentralised, worker and
'o Cj ¿T  ^Cu le><y ü
centralised state  national planning power a£^ee^n-^v^u?*^f'T>TiiTciing up the
V  .¿/- C- n <i.f <x> i J
former before, not a f te r ,  any massive s ta te  project for tfie^tak’eover of
enterprises^ |í\ain external trade and financial enterprises,
existing parastatals and large or medium scale enterprises abandoned by 
c a p i t a l i s t s ' V w .  sSC, o ^  \ r C $ p e c V  4 o  wUtcU» 6 ^ c
. to tr p ^ Ü í c ,  s c c W  ^
|^ The employment implications of economic organisation include productivity 
(including worker productivity), efficiency of allocation of potential surplus 
as perceived by the s ta te ,  workers and household (peasant) farmers -  and 
generation of substantial and rising  investible surpluses. These a l l  have a 
very direct impact on levels of present employment and remuneration levels and 
on investment to increase the future employment growth ra te .  The greatest 
dangers have l i t t l e  to do with the most familiar forms of the cap ita lis t  
m arket/socialist planning debate. They include:
a. premature departure of managerial and skilled personnel (even more than of 
owners as such) before adequate replacement personnel and structures are
to hand;
b. dissipation of s ta te  control capacity in ways which neither change the 
dominant mode of ownership nor improve efficiency of allocation but do 
reduce productivity and surplus generation;
c .  loss of access to knowledge and to external markets.
V h P  \ kl ¿t  r<LS<j lis/
NoneY'fs-’ inevitable^ ^11 are only too easy to "achieve" and each "EBS
.28 have damaging direct and indirect e ffe c ts  on employment levels and
remuneration patterns and -  even more serious -  on th eir  future growth.
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Training, Educating, Upgrading
One key to achieving enhanced black employment levels , average remuneration 
and growth rates is training-education-upgrading. The reasons are
straightforward:
a. South African growth has -  especially during sustained expansion periods 
-  been constrained by shortages of middle and high level personnel;
b. replacements will be needed for the not insignificant proportion of 
present trained white personnel who are already leaving, will do so 
before or on liberation and willfUrickle ./o r  flood?) out over the f i r s t  
ten years after  liberation /(u n less  p o lit ica lly  unacceptable
employment, as well as output, growth constraining levels of inequality  
hre retained)r;
  J '
c .  growth and structural transformation tend to increase the proportion as 
well as the absolute numbers of skilled -  including managerial and 
professional -  personnel required;
d. improvement of productivity and incomes in the household agricultural and 
"informal" sectors requires specialised training -  alb eit of a different  
type from mainline, large employer oriented training -  for both workers 
and supporting extension workers.
South Africa has many of the components for a sound education and training  
system. There is  no inherent reason -  except in relation  to "d" above -  why
the development of such a system on a non-racial, employment growth oriented
t  v t r r .  )
basis should pose major conceptual or p articu larly  T"( re la tiv e  to other 
policies) implementation problems.
However, i t  is  necessary to note the substantial gaps in the present system:
a. like almost everything else in South Africa i t  is  ra c ia lly  divided inMil/ V../ pb ¿¿C>JJQQ ¡ r .J
ways not conducive to e ffic ie n t attainment of veconomió^ór employment 
generation goals^ (Jr I * L i r o nj *
b. the white sub-system cannot be generalised to the entire population on
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i t s  present cost structure, because the resulting resource requirement 
could not be made available except at the cost of crippling other 
priority public expenditure--^ notably housing, pure water, health);
c .  the black sub-system is  plagued by deliberately warped content and 
ideology, inadequate financial and physical resources and a majority of 
underqualified s ta f f ;
d. the interaction between education and training and between both and in 
service upgrading is  inadequately conceptualised and articulated ; ^
f lJ lp r 0(5 c> c ) c j  t 'v ‘ ‘■i l° I  ¿ U  *
e . the "liberation now, education la te r"  approach ¡V3SC51 -  O’ ( liberation  
\ IW 0S
la ter  than NljSS4 -  reverse the broadening of the black educational base
and erode the sk il ls  of those participating in i t . I P r  y  r  ^ jp
'fVsd, «SfcJtV, f\$-r\ ¿ ' M - c
S W U k) p 4» .4/. - T> j
None of these obstacles -  . except; perhaps the - l a s t .. whictú3sCjablque^tion. for S ‘11 c*. *~
flliUeration mgyementpTHIad er 5 nof'technocrats-c^o appears to be insoluble. Each
reouires detailed study of options and comparable (semi-comparable) '
Mexperiences elsewhere & Ifcutf ^ e ith e r  technically nor p o li t ica l ly  do the barriers 
to taking and acting on informed decisions seem as high as in respect of many 
other issues relating to employment development.
Projection of sk ills  requirements is basic to effectiv e  education and
training. The 1960s and 1970s African experience with manpower planning is
currently considered to cast doubt on the possib ility  of pre-planned training
to meet pre-estimated requirements. This is  much too harsh a judgement «
Several exercises were re la tiv e ly  to very successful in terms of what they set 
\  I ry O-íic-','?! 0 a  ¿X» O Op J
out to do. &4rvifla&rt¿T"Their generic weaknesses can be identified and guarded
against. These include:
a . overspecification of the demand projections in terms of particular posts 
rather than^skills;
b. inadequate attention to middle level (e .g .  bookeeper, artisan) training 
and overemphasis on "main line academic" education (a weakness to which 
the ILO's currently fashionable "sk ills  module" approach appears to be an 
overreaction);
c . negligible attention to in -s e rv ic e ,  released time and other employer 
related programmes as well as to their interaction with more formal
education/training institution based programmes;
d. failure to tackle the relevance of universal access primary and
continuing education to productivity -  a weakness related to overemphasis 
on the ’'formal" sector and within i t  on large employment units.
Each can be guarded against in restructuring the South African training and
education system. Demand projection improvement may be more difficult .. A
Vff tr j or. p O vW.C-X? +:\\ j t  /  x/
s ta r t  would involve re-analysis and re -c la ss if ica tio n  of o f f ic ia l  RSjtynanpewer J
s ta t is t i c s  which are in an obscure and operationally exceedingly inconvenient
form quite apart from questions of accuracy and coverage. Knowing the present
situation and trends better would be a significant f i r s t  step toward being
able to estimate alternative future requirement, stock and flow projections.
However, in the f i r s t  decade after liberation the overriding problem is  likely
to be one of inadequate supply linked to time, physical resource and personnel
constraints. In that context even moderately large projection errors are
\rv-r,
unlikely to result in heavy investment in what",'prove to be re la tiv e ly  unusable 
sk ills  and time to work out better projections and adjust re la tiv e  programme 
(sk ill)  sizes can be anticipated to be available.
Tensions and Contradictions
To pretend that tensions and contradictions -  both between black workers and 
family farmers and other sub-classes and among black workers and family 
farmers can be avoided or fully harmoniously resolved would be naive and would 
exacerbate rather than a-voi-déng the tensions. Some have been sketched 
e a rlie r .
Qne clear conflict is  likely to be that between wages and agricultural prices » 
especially i f  investible surplus and consumption tax receipts are p rio rity
\ C Ct.j j
target syjrfhiotwwouXd—i-nonea-acr the attractiveness to workers (and economic 
decision takers wanting a quiet l i f e )  of a cheap food policy#( «*Such a policy -  
i f  based on low grower prices -  could limit agricultural output growth and the 
restablishment of viable black household farming. I t  would reduce the 
attain ab ility  of household incomes (including self  provisioning) above the
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poverty line in rural areas, thus leading to urban d r if t  and to continuation/ !yO
of sharp rural/urban income inequality
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Another tension is between organised - V>ptí/ in general1 above average sk ill  and
—  ---------- V iK,>0'JC. Jpresent income level -  tygfytytCd and less or unorganised^ -  and" in general below
average skill and present income level $ j.n-bonnjy The former can make a
rational productivity case for favoured treatment and will have not only the 
professional and public relations capacity to see that i t  is  heard but also  
the political clout (especially i f  p ro le taria t is translated "union 
leadership" and allocated a leading role in the governing sub-class
coalition) to ensure that i t  is  taken into account. The problem is  that given
fairly  tight constraints on to ta l  resources, such gains will mean less
V£\) g¿4  (\ i * f i ¿VJ i v  r  kAJ 
available for even lower income worker (including'p^^&nt) sub-classes and/or
curtailment of investment and therefore of the attainable employment growth
and absolute poverty reduction r a t e s . T h e  logical -  and perhaps attainable -  
route toward interim resolutions of this tension would appear to l ie
not in seeking to impose state  control on COSATU but rather in broadening 
trade union membership, creating parallel small farmer ^peasant )^ -  and 
probably both small scale se lf  employed and unemployed -  unions so that th eir  
members’ cases are equally cogently put and have comparable p o lit ica l  weight 
behind them.
Gender tensions will probably not turn on formal rights of equal access for 
women nor on comparable pay for comparable work but on rendering these rights  
e ffe c tiv e . Outside the "caring" (education, health) professions and 
secretaria l employment^women (including -  re lativ e  to white men -  white women) 
are objectively discriminated against. Very substantial changes in 
consciousness will be needed (especially , but not only, by men) to overcome
; that situation whatever the legal position. So will consideration of^and 
action to alleviate^, certain obstacles to effective  equality.,7c -■>
availability  of affordable child care f a c i l i t i e s  and lack of specific  
attention to issues relating to part time and broken period (e .g .  with la te  
entry and or "times out" related to infant and young child care reproductive 
responsibilities) employment and promotion patterns. These tensions are 
unlikely to be uniform across occupations or between contexts. Rapid growth
of employment in a particular line or (area and shortages of qualified blackl f \ c > , «-v I j
male entrants (as well as high o ver allA employment growth) are likely to reduce 
them (and to make(interim resolution more easily attainable) and vice versa.
The question of the future of temporary (or long term) immigrant workers from 
neighbouring sta tes  -  about 350,000 on contract (dominantly in mining) and up 
to 1,500,000 overall -  will be a d iff icu lt  one -  unless a purely chauvinist 
answer is perceived to be acceptable. Because of the warping of their own 
economies (and the South African) to serve a regional sub-system of white 
power, privilege and p ro fit ,  they have l i t t l e  present or short term access to 
above poverty line incomes i f  repatriated. That they -  and their ancestors -  
have been exploited to build the South African productive and infrastructural  
capacity is a fa c t .  However, demand for formal wage employment will exceed 
supply in post liberation South Africa; the black South Africans (at least to 
date) have lost by the importation of foreign labour; any state  owes a primary 
and overriding duty to i t s  own c itiz e n s . ^
¡T* tAsJ F O  f  <-J f\' F  / » f~ O r '  A  M \  / V v v - é v  i ^  '"f" t v \
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L Lesotho is  a special vcase (as is  Southern Mozambique alb eit to a lesser and" \ rittK\ 1- vv t*
moreNwmewwwy Alterable degree). Wage employment of Basotho in South Africa is
of the order of 10 to 12 times that in Lesotho. Indeed Lesotho is more
accurately perceived as a long distance bed-sitting room for the Free State
a n S s / l l a n d  t h a n  a s  a n  a c t u a l l y ,  o r  e v e n  p o t e n t i a l l y ,  i n t e g r a t e d  n a t i o n a l  o r
te r r i to r ia l  economy. Normative considerations apart, rapid repatriation would
leave South Africa with a bankrupt, unstable neighbour filled  with bitter and
virtually  l i te r a l ly  starving people. One solution might be to agree to an
economic confederation with Lesotho including free movement of labour.
Arguably Lesotho and a post apartheid South Africa should consider union^ 1 5^-
Lesotho's history and the legacy of apartheid suggest that (even if  feasible
s. \J ^ ^
over a 20' to 30 year perspective)js t^&afc^is no through road in the short run. 
More generally, long term (say five years work or longer in South Africa 
within the la s t  ten years) foreign workers might be offered the right of 
citizenship by reg istra tio n  (as applied by Zimbabwe fa, which also had a high 
"foreign African" share in employment at independence).
1CV <rry\ k'O'vn
Technical and technological problems (a$r--iea-sfc taken in combination with 
available knowledge and financial resources) will pose severe obstacles to 
attaining full employment/self employment at or above the poverty line in a 
liberated South Africa. The underlying incremental formal employment/output
poverty line in rural areas, thus leadipg to urban d r if t  and to continuation  
of sharp rural/urban income inequality. A
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Another tension is between organised -  in general, a,bove average sk ill  and
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present income level -  \Tpl3.CyiV and less or unorganised, -- arid in general below
average skill and present income level # io-bo^n. The former can make a
rational productivity case for favoured treatment and will have not only the
professional and public relations capacity to see that i t  is  heard but also
the political clout (especially i f  p ro le taria t is  translated "union
leadership" and allocated a leading role in the governing sub-class
coalition) to ensure that i t  is  taken into account. The problem is  that given
fairly  tight constraints on to ta l  resources, such gains will mean less
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a v a i l a b l e  f o r  e v e n  l o w e r  i n c o m e  w o r k e r  ( i n c l u d i n g " p 1q ^ a s t ) s u b - c l a s s e s  a n d / o r
curtailment of investment and therefore of the attainable employment growth
and absolute poverty reduction r a te s .j j  The logical -  and perhaps attainable -  
route toward interim resolutions of this tension would appear to l ie
not in seeking to impose state  control on COSATU but rather in broadening 
trade union membership, creating parallel small farmer ^peasant^ -  and 
probably both small scale se lf  employed and unemployed -  unions so that th eir  
members’ cases are equally cogently put and have comparable p o lit ica l  weight 
behind them.
Gender tensions will probably not turn on formal rights of equal access for
women nor on comparable pay for comparable work but on rendering these rights
e ffe c tiv e . Outside the "caring" (education, health) professions and
secretaria l employment^women (including -  re la tiv e  to white men -  white women)
are objectively discriminated against. Very substantial changes in
consciousness will be needed (especially , but not only, by men) to overcome
that situation whatever the legal position. So will consideration of^and
action to alleviate^, certain obstacles to effective  equality ,.j c q > .1 .. 'ff f?
availability  of affordable child care f a c i l i t i e s  and lack of specific
attention to issues relating to part time and broken period (e .g .  with la te
entry and or "times out" related to infant and young child care reproductive
responsibilities) employment and promotion patterns. These tensions are
unlikely to be uniform across occupations or between contexts. Rapid growth
of employment in a particular line or area and shortages of qualified blacka- •} J, ■,,.. «v \j
male entrants (as well as high overailV'employment growth) are likely to reduce 
them (and to maketinterim resolution more easily attainable) and vice versa.
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The question of the future of temporary (or long term) immigrant workers from
neighbouring states  -  about 350,000 on contract (dominantly in mining) and up
to 1,500,000 overall -  will be a d iff icu lt  one -  unless a purely chauvinist
answer is perceived to be acceptable. Because of the warping of their own
economies (and the South African) to serve a regional sub-system of white
power, privilege and p ro fit ,  they have l i t t l e  present or short term access to
above poverty line incomes i f  repatriated . That they -  and their ancestors -
have been exploited to build the South African productive and infrastructural
capacity is a f a c t .  However, demand for formal wage employment will exceed
supply in post liberation South Africa; the black South Africans (at least to
date) have lost by the importation of foreign labour; any state  owes a primary
and overriding dutv to i t s  own citiz e n s . i
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L Lesotho is a special ,case (as is  Southern Mozambique albeit to a lesser and"ÑTrü (k \^ t  / t. <■- X SjpJ cLC -
more > «¡nmniiy alterable degree). Wage employment of Basotho in South Africa is j,
of the order of 10 to 12 times that in Lesotho. Indeed Lesotho is more p j  jouj
I'accurately perceived as a long distance bed-sitting room for the Free State
anav/Rand than as an actu ally , or even potentially , integrated national or ■ f f i
te r r i to r ia l  economy. Normative considerations apart, rapid repatriation would
leave South Africa with a bankrupt, unstable neighbour filled  with bitter and
virtually  l i te r a l ly  starving people. One solution might be to agree to an
economic confederation with Lesotho including free movement of labour.
Arguably Lesotho and a post apartheid South Africa should consider union^
Lesotho's history and the legacy of apartheid suggest that (even i f  feasible
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over a 20' to 30 year p e r s p e c t i v e i s  no through road in the short run.
More generally, long term (say five years work or longer in South Africa 
within the la s t  ten years) foreign workers might be offered the right of 
citizenship by reg istra tio n  (as applied by Zimbabwe which also had a high 
"foreign African" share in employment at independence).
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Technical and technological problems (aty—Jteas.t taken in combination with 
available knowledge and financial resources) will pose severe obstacles to 
attaining full employment/self employment at or above the poverty line in a 
liberated South Africa. The underlying incremental formal employment/output
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growth ra tio  is  probably of the order of 0.5 to 0.6 so that at least 5 to 6?
growth would be required to hold the formal employment proportion constant apd-^^
V  ■ 01 ko ............* » ' " • ) /  i c  .1 s ] 4 < w O )
10? to reduce the 50?.' below thé“ ábsdluté~poverty^'to 0? cczmS 20 years. Even -
allowing for once for a l l  redistributive shifts -  including recreating a
viable black household (or co-operative farming^sub-class -  which halved the
i n i t i a l  50? below the poverty line in the transitional period, ,8?  annual
<- o í » 1 '! w  p> a  \¿i r i-y _t t l U  T )  
growth would seem to be needed to acHieve^the/target in'Under two decades.
That set of ratios poses the personal consumption/public services/investment
tradeoff starkly. 8? growth (validated by market broadening through poverty
reduction) would probably require a gross investment to output ra tio  of 28%.
Even assuming savings of 5% of GDP on security, administration and subsidy
expenditure from scrapping apartheid, to ta l  recurrent public spending,
universal basic public service access (including production oriented extension
services as well as health, education and water) is  unlikely to require less
than 15? of GDP (in terras implying a recurrent budget of 25?
plus of GDP). 57? for personal consumption will not allow substantial real
increases to black workers presently above the poverty line unless white
incomes are cut drastically  in real terms. While nominally possible, cuts
large enough to have that effect would lead to an exodus of precisely those
white workers and managers whose sk ills  are scarcest and most needed (and who
\ i octs ck-\ o
are , therefore, most globally mobile JV/'-great'Ty*' 'exacerbatiria training  
requirements ancK'the risk of failing to achieve a once for a l l  capacity  
u tilisa tio n  and rehabilitation recovery in output a f te r  liberation^(Zimbabwe’ s 
in i t i a l  economic recovery was over 25? from an economy whose degree of 
rundownness and undercapacity use may turn out to be comparable to South 
A frica 's  at liberation). I t  would also prejudice -  a lb eit decreasingly over 
time -  the achievement of the 6? growth target which would otherwise appear 
perfectly plausible, le t  alone the 8? one which is problematic a lb eit not 
necessarily impossible. IrVSEUlT
The implicit constraint on personal consumption i f  employment self/employment 
targets are defined as including rapid reduction of absolute poverty flowing 
from lack of adequate access to adequately productive and remunerated se lf  
employment/employmen1' and i t s  elimination in two decades will lead to other 
tensions. One is between more productive ( i . e .  skilled and scarce) and other 
workers. An overlapping but not identical one will be between well organised 
(basically unionised) and less well or unorganised (probably including both
A\
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pea^an-t/s and the urban "informal" sector) workers. A third will be on gender 
lines -  increased and increasingly equal access to a l l  branches of employment 
will face much s t i f f e r  opposition in a context of low real income rises (and a 
fo r tio r i  of low formally recorded wage and salary employment growth). Another 
is  urban/rural because with limited personal consumption capacity the tendency
to an urban bias in i t s  distribution (and in that of public services) will
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increase'>-^H?ia««aí‘"parálléls'trend% í^rising rural to urban migration, greater 
continuity of the present divided family/poverty reserve pattern and tía? 
failure to recreate a viable black agricultural sub-sector. A final tension 
would relate  to workers from neighbouring African sta tes  (especially to those 
in mining). Under conditions of low personal consumption growth  ^pressure for 
theirV'refiktriation would be heightened. All of these tensions would be 
exacerbated further were low achieved growth to reduce the rate of growth of
employment significantly below 4%.^  w-hi?eh would be a likely result of
reconciling their in i t ia l  manifestations by more generous wage increases at
the expense of investible surplus and/or of loss of internal and/or external
balance with rising payments d e fic its  and inflation r a t e s /
Personpower or personnel planning/forecasting and training to meet the 
requirements identified are not exact sciences. However, once feasible growth 
;treS~'anci“desired^ patterns of stru ctu ral changej^have been identified workable 
estimates of requirements and at least broadly relevant training programmes
\ should be identifiable and implementable. The most uncertain element is  
\ likely to be the rate of white exodus which, i f  high, will both increase 
Y . Y  a  requirements and (by removing skilled personnel) weaken the training capacity 
‘ /  to meet them.
/
The economic organisation/mode of production choices and sequences are likely  
to affect achieved employment growth but not on any crude public/private 
efficiency line of argument (in either d ire c tio n ) . The three basic factors  
will be degree of worker participation and commitment and their effect on 
productivity and investible surplus; achievement of effective  state power 
(direct or indirect) over macro, sectoral and major enterprise economic 
decisions; phasing $na adequate buildup of black senior personnel with 
competence, training and experience rapidly enough to avert major loss of 
efficiency from the a t t r i t io n  of existing -  largely white -  high level 
personnel stocks. The loss by departure of small scale capitalists  -  
especially in commerce and agriculture -  is  likely  under any plausible
economic restructuring and may -  depending on the v i ta l i ty  of the black 
private and cooperative sectors -  have a positive effec t  on black employment 
and -  after  a brief transition -  a neutral one on overall output.
Clearly, post apartheid South Africa will have high ra tio s  of public 
expenditure to GDP; of public investment to to ta l  investment and of public to 
to ta l  directly  productive a c t iv i ty .  Equally i t  is  v irtu ally  certain to have a 
highly interventionist s tate  whose economic instruments range well beyond
macro level (as do those of Brazil and South Korea just as much as those of 
Nicaragua or Algeria) even i f  they may well focus on market management and 
decentralisation of public sector decision taking rather more than on 
comprehensive material balances planning and centralisation  of micro level
economic decisions. What the scope of in i t ia l  additions to the public sector
X w  (1 Í* ) J
will be or what fciite sequencing of subsequent expansion ,-cannot be
prognosticated with any pretence at accuracy nor can the balance among macro
(via the sta te )  and enterprise level (via organised enterprise workers)
contibutions to co-management of major enterprises. Both technical and
p o lit ica l  contexts and balances of power at the point of liberation which
cannot now be forecast will significantly a ffec t  the choices made both
d irectly  and (e .g . by adopting policies leading to a high proportion of
abandoned ex -ca p ita lis t  enterprises, the largest single source of the
Mozambican public sector) indirectly . So 3 <J k s C, t, ^  \  e.v'atwJ'hXCo r
\ ^ ) v*J \ i "iV\t 0 "Vva \ S v* " O IivS 5 O $ Art' i \  ^ «
The foregoing issues are primarily p o lit ica l  economic. Further research on
th eir  probable parameters and the probable effects  of altern ative approaches
I iLJ
to resolving them would certainly be desirable and help to inform dialogue and
decision taking. However, the basic requirement is  dialogue leading to
decision taking by the liberation movement presumably with broader subsequent 
consultation with workers and peasants in South Africa in the la te r  stages of 
the liberation struggle or immediately upon liberation .
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T a b l e s
A Note on Table Sources
These tables are derived largely from o ff ic ia l  sources and selected academ 
analyses. A number have been adapted from M. Lipton, Capitalism And 
Apartheid, South Africa 1910-1986, Wildwood (Gower), London, 1966.
TABLE 1
SOUTH AFRICA: POPULATION 
(Number = %)
Census Year 1911 1936 1960 1980
Whites 1 . 3 ( 2 1 ) 2 . 0 (2 1 ) 3 .1(19) 4 .5(16)
Africans 4 .0(67) 6.6(69) 1 0 . 9 ( 68) 2 0 . 8 (7 2 )*
Coloureds 0 .5 (9 ) 0 . 8 (8 ) 1 .5 (9 ) 2 .6 (9 )
Indians 5.9(100) 9 . 6 ( 1 0 0 ) 16.0(100) 28.7(100)
* Including 3.9  in ’ independent homelands’
TABLE 2
URBANISATION: NUMBERS AND PROPORTIONS 
(Number in 000,000)
1911 1936 1951 1960 1970 1980
Census Year No . % No % No % No % No % No %
Whites 0.7 51 .6 1.3 65.2 2 . 1 78.4 2 . 6 83.6 3.3 86.8 4.0 88.3
Africans 0.5 1 2 . 6 1 . 1 17.3 2.3 2 7 . 2 3.5 CO 00 5.1 33.1 6.9 32.9
Coloureds 0.3 46.7 0.4 53.9 0.7 64.7 1 . 0 68.3 1 .5 74.1 2 . 0 74.6
Indians 0.07 43.2 0 .2 6 6 . 3 0.3 77.5 0.4 8 3 . 2 0 . 6 86.7 0.7 90.6
Total 1.5 24.7 3.0  31.4 5.4 42.6 7 .5  46.7 10.4 47.8 1 3 - 6  47.1
TABLE 3
AFRICAN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 1946-80 
(Number in 000,000)
19*46 1960 1970 1980
Location No % No % No % No %
'Reserves’ 3-1 140 14.0 37 7.14 U7 10 . 7 53
'White' Rural Areas 2 . 8 37 3 - 3  32 3.14 22 2 . 6 13
Urban 1 .9 23 3 . 5  31 5.1 32 6 . 9 33
TABLE 14
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 
(Thousands, figures in ( ) = % of group economically active)
Sector Year Whites Africans Coloureds Indians
% active in 
Total sector
Agriculture 1951 1145 1 , 25 2 98 13 1 , 5 0 9 33
1980 102 1 , 67 3 1149 7 1,931 20
Mining 1951 57 14149 14 1 510 11
1980 90 768 13 2 873 9
Manufacturing 1951 250 360 109 214 7*42 16
& Construction 1980 1463 1 , 1 0 3 307 108 2,011 21
Services 1951 503 932 152 1414 1 ,629 314
1980 1 , 20 2 2 , 2 2 9 375 1214 3 , 9 3 0 141
Unemployed & 1951 28 118 142 114 202 6
Unspecified 1980 141 735 814 15 291 9
T o t a l  Econo­ 1951 9814(37) 3 , 1 1 1 ( 3 7 ) 14014 ( 37) 9*4(26) H, 592( 36)
m i c a l l y  Act i ve 1980 1 , 928(143) 6 , 5 2 3 ( 3 1  ) 9 2 8 ( 3 6 ) 2 5 6 ( 3 2 ) 9,635(3*4)
Note: The % economically active appears so low as to suggest serious under­
estimation of self employment, ’informal’ employment and unemployment 
notably among the black groups as well as by women and in rural areas
TABLE 5
A. AVERAGE GROWTH OF GDP IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY, 1960-85
Period Annual Percentage Growth 
GDP Population Per capita
1960-65 6.1 (2 .4) 3.7
1965-70 5.5 (2.4) 3.1
1970-75 4.0 (2.8) 1.2
1975-80 2.7 (2 .8) -0 .1
1980-85 1.1 (2.8) -1 .7
B. SECTORAL MAKEUP OF GDP *
1911
Agriculture 21
Mining 28
Manufacturing, Construction,
Power and Water ** 5
Services *** A6
1936 1951 1960 1970 1980
15 19 11 8 7
19 13 14 10 23
13
53
22
46
24
51
27
55
26
44
GDP at factor cost, current prices.
Usually about 80* -  85% manufacturing proper.
The relative constancy of the share is  somewhat deceptive as 
the makeup has altered substantially.
TABLE 6
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: CATEGORY AND ETHNIC GROUP
(No. = 000)
Category
Whites ,  
No. %
Africans, 
No. %
Coloured, 
No. %
Indians ,  
No. %
Total , ,  
No. %
Prof essional/
Technical 1960 138 67 48 23 14 7 5 2 206 3.6
1980 371 57 205 31 51 8 23 4 650 6.8
Administrative/
Managerial 1960 59 87 6 9 1 1 2 3 68 1 .2
1980 126 91 5 4 3 2 4 3 138 1 .4
Clerical 1960 276 88 19 6 9 3 8 3 313 5.5
1980 505 60 211 25 70 8 53 6 839 8.7
Sales 1960 97 61 29 18 10 6 23 14 160 2.8
1980 196 44 180 40 38 8 37 8 451 4.7
Service 1960 59 7 711 78 118 13 15 2 902 15.8
Production/
1980 156 11 1 ,174 78 153 10 17 1 1 ,499 15.6
Labourer 1960 376 19 1,316 68 214 11 43 2 1,949 34.1
(non-agricultural) 1980 434 16 2,304 69 387 13 104 3 3,230 33.6
Agricultural 1960 117 7 1 ,475 85 128 7 12 1 1,731 30.3
1980 89 5 1 ,734 87 155 8 6 1 ,992 20.7
««»
Unclassified/ 1960 28 7 286 73 59 15 17 4 391 6.8
Unemployed 1980 28 3 702 86 71 9 12 1 813 8.4
Total 1960 1 ,150 20 3,890 68 554 10 126 2 5,720 100
1980 1 ,905 20 6,524 68 928 10 226 2 9,613 100
* of category
** of a l l  economically active
*** seriously underestimated
TABLE 7
REAL WAGES IN 1970 PRICES: SELECTED SECTORAL AND ETHNIC TRENDS
(In Rand per Month)
ft*
Year
Manufacturing/Construction 
White African Ratio White
*
Gold Mining 
African Ratio
1915/16 (1911) 1,168 223 5.3 2,632 225 11.7
1929/30 (1931) 1,258 247 5.1 2,214 186 11.3
1939/40 (1941) 1,418 278 5.3 2 , 3 1 2 191 12.1
1944/45 - 1,726 414 4.2 - - -
1952/53 (1951) 2,106 416 5.1 2,745 188 14.6
1959/60 (1961) 2,463 458 5.4 3,184 188 16.9
1965 - 2,735 514 5.3 - - -
1970 (1971) 3,633 609 6.0 4,379 209 20.9
1975 (1975) 3,893 805 4.8 5,035 602 8.4
1S80 - 3,514 773 4.5 - - -
1982 (1982) 4,305 978 4.4 4,501 824 5.5
* Cash wages only. To the extent African non cash wages plus 
fringe benefits are a higher proportion of to ta l  income than 
fringe benefits are of white, the ratio  will be overstated.
** ( 1 9 1 1 ) e tc .  are nearest available years for mining.
TABLE 8
ETHNIC GROUP SHARES OF TOTAL* PERSONAL INCOME
1924/5 1946/7 1960 1970 1980
Whites 75 71.3 71.2 71.9 59-9
Africans 18 22.2 21.4 19.3 29.1
Coloureds 5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.6
Indians 2 2 1.9 2.3 3.4
* Probably serious underestimation of se lf  provisioning
(subsistence), small scale ("informal") and other part time 
self employment incomes. These are probably a higher % of 
black than of white incomes, but not to a degree likely to 
alter the income distribution estimates substantially.
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